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These conclusions make it unnecessary to discuss the point.s
raised by the respondents.
The judgment is affirmed.

ship company employee reporting for work was struck by a
company car as he emerged from a taxicab which had stopped
on a paved bulkhead adjoining the company's premises, and
said bulkhead constituted the only practical means of reaching his place of employment, his injuries were sustained in
the course of his employment, and it was immaterial that
the accident happened fifteen minutes before he was to begin
work.
[4] Id.-Compensable Injuries-Injuries Received Outside Regular
Working Hours, etc.-Entering or Leaving Employer's Premises-Existence of Special Risk.-While an employee is
ordinarily not entitled to compensation for injuries sustained
in going to or departing from work, he if; entitled to compensation, if the employment creates a special risk, for injuries
sustained within the field of that risk. Such a risk may
attend the employee as soon as he enters the employer's
premises or the necessary means of access thereto, even when
the latter is not under the employer's control or management.

Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Ourtis, J., Carter, J., and Traynor, J., concurred.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied December
11, 1941. Carter, J.,. voted for a rehearing.

[So F. No. 16587.

In Bank.

Nov. 14, 1941.]

JOHN FREIRE, Appellant, v. MATSON NAVIGATION
COMP ANY (a Oorporation), Respondent.
[1] Workmen's Compensation-Remedy Under Act-As Exclusive
~Injuries Within Scope of Remedy.-The rule of Lab. Code,
§ 3202, that the TV' orkmen's Compensation Act is to be liberally
construed in favor of the jurisdiction of the Industrial Accident Commission, is not altered because a plaintiff believes
that he can establish negligence of his employer and brings a
civil action for damages. If the injury falls within the scope
of the act, a proceeding thereunder constitutes his exclusive
remedy.
[2] Id.-Remedy Under Act-As Exclusive-Civil Action and Application for Compensation.~If an employee is in doubt as
to whether his injury is sustained in the course of his employment, he can protect himself against the running of the
statute of limitations, and be certain that his claim will be
heard in a proper tribunal, by filing both a civil action in the
superior court and :an application for compensation before
the Industrial Accident Commission.
[3a-3c] Id. - Compensable Injuries - Injuries Received Outside
Regular Working Hours, etc.-Entering or Leaving Employer's
Premises-Injuries Sustained on Bulkhead.-Where a steam-

[1]

See 27 Cal. Jur. 259, 262; 12 Cal. Jur. Ten-year Supp. 4, 5.
Injuries while entering or leaving place of employment as
arising out of or in course of employment, note, 39 A. L. R. 424.
See, also, 27 Cal. Jur. 387.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2J Workmen's Compensation, § 11;
[3, 4J Workmen's Compensation, § 102; [5J Workmen's Compensation, § 93.

[3J

~~

-

[5] ld.-Compensable Injuries-Perils Peculiar to EmploymentRisks of Streets and Travel-Danger to General Public.The facts that an accident happens npon a public road, and the
danger is one to which the general public is likewise exposed, do not preclude the existence of a causal relationship between the accident and the employment if the danger
is one to which the enlployee, by reason of and in connection
with his employment, is subjected peculiarly or to an abnormal degree.

APPEAL from a jUdgment of the Superior Oourt of the
City and County of San Francisco. 1.' M. Golden, Judge.
Affirmed.
Carl W. v\!ynkoop and Philander B. Beadle for Appellant.
Hoge, Pelton & Gunther and A. Dal 'rhomson for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiff was employed as a janitor upon
a steamship owned and operated by defendant company. He
did not reside on the ship when it was moored, but reported
regularly for duty at 8 a. m. at the steward's office on the
vessel. On November 7, 1938, about 7 :45 a. m., he arrived
[5 J Injury to employee while in street in front of employer's
when going to or coming from work, note, 85 A. L. R. 97.

pr~mises
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in a taxicab at pier 32 in San Francisco, where the ship was
moored. The taxicab came to a stop on the bulkhead in front
of the pier and plaintiff opened the door to get out. As he
stepped upon the running board, an automobile owned by
defendant company and driven by one of its employees in
the scope of his employment, backed into the side of the
taxicab, crushing plaintiff's foot. Plaintiff brought an action
for damages in the superior court, contending that the injury occurred while he was going to work and therefore,
under the going and coming rule, did not arise out of or
occur in the course of his employment. Defendant contends
that the plaintiff sustained the injury within the zone of
employment and that his sole remedy lies under the W orkmen's Compensation Act, with exclusive jurisdiction in the
Industrial Accident Commission. The trial court directed
a verdict for defendant company and plaintiff appeals from
the judgment entered thereon.
[1] The Workmen's Compensation Act is to be liberally
construed in favor of jurisdiction in the commission with the
purpose of extending the benefits of the act for the protection of persons injured in the course of their employment.
(Labor C.ode, sec. 3202; Fenton v. Industrial Ace. Com.,
44 Cal. App. (2d) 379, 382 [112 Pac. (2d) 763].) The rule
is not altered because a plaintiff believes that he can establish negligence on the part of his employer and brings a
civil suit for damages. If the injury falls within the scope
of the act, a proceeding thereunder constitutes his exclusive
remedy. (Labor Code, sec. 3601; see cases cited in 27 Cal.
Jur. 262, and 12 Cal. Jur. Ten-Year Supp. 4, 5.) [2] If an
employee is in doubt whether or not his injury is sustained
in the course' of his employment, he can protect himself against
the running of the statute of limitations, and be certain that
his claim will be heard in the proper tribunal, by filing both
a 'civil action in the superior court and an application for
compensation before the commission. (Schumacker v. Industrial Ace. Com., 46 Cal. App. (2d) 95 [115 Pac. (2d) 571].)
[Sa] The question whether plaintiff's injury arose out of
and in the course of his employment turns upon the relation of
the bulkhea.d upon which the accident occurred to plaintiff's
place of employment. The bulkhead is a strip of pavement
approximately 62 feet wide that lies between the public
street known as the Embarcadero on the west and the piers
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and buildinb''l on the east. The State Board of Harbor Commissioners have assigned to defendant company the use of
piers 30 and 32, inclusive of the building thereon and the
premises up to the bulkhead upon which the pier entrances
face, but not inclusive of the bulkhead. While the bulkhead
is under the control and management of the Harbor Commission, it constitutes the only means of reaching the pier,
where the ship was moored, from the Embarcadero. That
part of the bulkhead adjoining the premises assigned to defendant company appears to be used to a considerable extent
for the purposes of the company. Thus, it serves to facilitate the handling of cargoes during periods of congestion and
is used by persons having business with the company as a
thoroughfare for their trucks, drays, and other vehicles, and
by stevedores, seamen, passengers and visitors as a parking
place. Defendant employs a large number of special officers
who, in the course of their duties, control traffic on the
bulkhead and keep the entrances to the piers clear. The
gate to the piers opens at eight 0 'clock, and those who arrive
earlier must wait upon the bulkhead until that time. On the
morning of the accident, the bulkhead was crowded with
stevedores and other employees of defendant company who
were waiting for the gate to open. The vehicles that were
on the bulkhead at the time were there for the most part in
connection with company business.
[4] It is well settled that while an employee is ordinarily
not entitled to workmen's compensation for an injury sustained in going to or departing from work, he is entitled to
compensation, if the employment creates a special risk, for injuries sustained within the field of that risk. Such a risk may
attend the employee as soon as he enters the employer's
premises or the necessary means of access thereto, even when
the latter is not under the employer's control or management. (Starr Piano Co. v. Ind,ustrial Ace. Com., 181 Cal.
433 [184 Pac. 860] ; J'ndson Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com.,
181 Cal. 300 [184 Pac. 1]; Globe Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com.) 208 Cal. 715, 719 [284 Pac. 661J. See
lJIlakins v. Industrial Ace. Com., 198 Cal. 698, 701 [247 Pac.
202, 49 A. L. R. 411] ; Jimeson v. Industrial Ace. Com., 23
Cal. App. (2d) 634, 638, 639 [73 Pac. (2d) 1238] ; Cromwell
v. Los Angeles Ry. Corp., 102 Cal. App. 499, 502 [283 Pac.
375] ; 23 Cal. L. Rev. 366, 367.)
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: [3b] It is evident fr0 In, the facts in the instant case that

the bulkhead is "the means of access" to the pier "required
and authorized by the company, " that it is "in fact, 'dominant
as to user in the employer, servient to its purpose, and int~mately associated with its plant as a part of its necessary
establishment." (Judson Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com.,
supra, p. 301.) In Judson 1J.ffg. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com.,
supra, the employee was killed while walking on a path
leading from the end of a public street to the gate of his
employer's factory. The path was on the railroad right of
way and was neither owned nor controlled by the employer,
but the court awarded compensation upon the grounds that
it was the necessary 'means of access to. the employer's premises, required by the employer and contemplated in the employment, and that as between the employer and his employees
it was in practice a part of the employer's plant. The only
difference of note between the path in the Judson case and
the bulkhead in the instant case is that the first was owned
by a private third party while the latter is public property.
Plaintiff contends that since, the bulkhead is public prop- ,
erty, he encountered no more hazard there than would any'"
member of the public, that he was exposed to no special hazard
incidental to his employment. [5] The facts that an accident happens upon a public road and that the danger is one
to which the general public is likewise exposed, however, do
not preclude the existence of a causal relationship between
the accident and the employment if the danger is one to
which the employee, by reason of and in connection with his
employmerit, is subjected peculiarly or to an abnormal degree. (State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Industrial Acc;
Oom., 194 Cal. 28, 31 [227 Pac. 168] ; Ct"dahy Packing 00.
v. Parramore, 263 U. S. 418 [44 Sup. Ct. 153, 68 L. Ed.
366].) In State Oompensation Ins. Fund v. Industrial
Acc. Com., supra, the employee was awarded compensation
for an injury sustained on a public sidewalk outside the
entrance to her employer's premises. The entrance was one
that she was required to use and the injury directly resulted
from the slippery condition of this entrance and the adjoining
runway over the sidewalk, caused by the acts of other employees. ,In Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore, supra, the
Supreme Court of the United States held thRt a causal relationship couid be iOUlid between the employme.n.t ,and t~e
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death of an employee killed while crossing a railroad track
on a pUblic road that constituted the customary and only
practical way of reaching the employer's plant. (See, also,
cases cited in note, 85 A. L. R. 97. Cf. Jimeson v. Indtlstrial
Ace. Com., supra, p. 638.)
[3e] In the instant-case the plaintiff by reason of his employment was subjected to the risks arising on the bulkhead
peculiarly and to an abnormal degree. At the time of his
injury plaintiff was upon the bulkhead solely in the line of
his duty as an employee. (See Judson Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., S1l,pra, p. 302.) He was obliged to be there
on the morning of the accident before eight 0 'clock in readiness to go on the pier and thence to his ship at that time.
The injury to plaintiff occurred upon the only praetical
means of access to the employer's premises. The hazard
to which he was subjected when he arrived upon the bulkhead was created by his employer, its agents and those with
whom it did business. (See State Compensation Ins. F1md
v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra.) Under these circumstances,
the hazard was one directly connected with the employment
and, under the authority of the cases cited, the injury was
one arising out of and in the course of plaintiff's employment.
The fact that the accident happened some minutes before
plaintiff was to begin work is immaterial. (Judson Mfg. Co.
v. Industrial Acc. Oom., supra. See Oromwell v. Los Angeles
Ry. Corp., supra.) "The employment contemplated his entry
upon and departure from the premises as much as it contemplated his working there, and must include a reasonable
interval of time for that purpose." (Cudahy Packing 00.
v. Parramore, supra, p. 426.)
The plaintiff's remedy, therefore, is under the Workmen'~
Compensation Act and the judgment from which plaintiff
appeals is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Edmonds, J., concurred.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied December
11, 1941. C.urtis, J., and Carter, J., voted for a rehearing.

